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by Anthony D'Amato*, 64 A.J.I.L 892-902 (1970) 
 
Abstract:  I shall argue in this essay that the World Court used a method which might be called the rule of 
manifest intent in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, that this method differs from a more traditional approach 
found in the writings of publicists, and that this new method accords well with the growing need to objectify and 
place upon a scientific basis the methodology by which one may determine what in fact are the rules of customary 
law. 
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 [pg892]** The World Court's recent decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
FN1 is a major contribution to that branch of the theory of customary international law dealing 
with norm-creation by means of a treaty. The Court articulated a new methodology for 
determining which provisions in treaties can form the basis of universally binding customary 
law. As the spreading network of international conventions becomes more fine-meshed, the 
substantive rules of international customary law may be expected to conform more and more 
closely to the provisions in these conventions. The World Court has implicitly recognized this 
process in many prior opinions, but it was not until the Continental Shelf decision that the link 
between treaty and custom was focused upon with precision. I shall argue in this essay that the 
Court used a method which might be called the rule of manifest intent, that this method differs 
from a more traditional approach found in the writings of publicists, and that this new method 
accords well with the growing need to objectify and place upon a scientific basis the 
methodology by which one may determine what in fact are the rules of customary law. 
 
I. THE BASIS FOR THE CONTINENTAL SHELF DECISION 
 
Courts do not announce methodological procedures in a vacuum; rather,  
a  specific decision is the agency which gives life and shape to methods of legal analysis. The 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases presented a very special kind of problem which perforce 
colored the Court's analytical methods. At the heart of the dispute was whether the concept of 
equidistanceFN2 is internationally required as determining the legal shares in the North Sea of 
the adjacent coastal states, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, and The Netherlands. This 
concept was given expression in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf,FN3 a multilateral convention among 39 states, including Denmark and The 
Netherlands but not including the Federal Republic, which disputes the equidistance 
concept.FN4 As the Court immediately pointed out, an equidistance line between two adjacent 
states extending into a body of water [pg893] divides the water roughly equally for the states so 
long as their coastlines are straight or nearly straight. But where one coastline is concave or 
recessing, then an equidistance line between the concave state and the straight state would 
disproportionately favor the latter, cutting off the former's access to the body of water and the 
subjacent seabed.FN5 Since the Federal Republic's coast is concave to both the adjacent 
states—Denmark and The Netherlands—an equidistance line would meet at the apex of a 
triangle at a relatively short distance from the Federal Republics coast, "cutting off” any further 
areas of the continental shelf beyond this triangle.FN6 But this method as applied to Germany 
would, in the Court's words, produce “results that appear on the face of them to be 
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extraordinary, unnatural or unreasonable,"FN7. The Court added in plain and certain terms: "It 
is basically this fact which underlies the present proceedings."FN8 
 
 The Federal Republic had indeed signed the 1958 Convention, although it never ratified.  
Was it aware at the time of signing of what Article 6, paragraph 2, would accomplish in its own 
case? Probably not; the Court says that the Federal Republic’s various declarations concerning 
the convention as well as its signing of the convention were done "before becoming fully aware 
of what the probable effects in the North Sea would be." FN9 Moreover, if the real party in 
interest, that is, the party with the concave coast, was asleep at the switch for many years with 
respect to the effect of the equidistance concept, it is likely that the framers of the 1958 
Convention themselves did not know that it would produce "extraordinary, unnatural or 
unreasonable" effects in the unanticipated situation of a concave coast. This is indeed in part the 
Court's conclusion after examining the travaux preparatoires; no one ever mentioned the idea 
of a concave coast, and thus the equidistance concept was probably not intended explicitly to 
cover such a situation. On the other hand, there were indications in the travaux that in certain 
cases "the geographical configurations of the coast would render a boundary drawn on [the 
equidistance] basis inequitable,"FN10 For this latter reason, Article 6, paragraph 2, was framed 
with deliberate qualifications so that the equidistance concept at least did not stand out as the 
unalloyed rule in all cases. Thus, on either argument, the Court was able to find that it certainly 
was not the clear intent of the treaty provision to require the application of the equidistance 
principle in the extraordinary case of a concave coast.  
 
 Thus far the Court's opinion, treating Article 6, paragraph 2, as it would a statute, 
espouses a liberal interpretation where a literal one would be inequitable. The situation recalls 
the fictional case of the Speluncean Explorers, in which Professor Fuller has a court read in the 
word "not," which had been omitted from a statute through errors of the successive draftsmen 
and sponsors of the legislation; without that word, the final clause of the statute would have 
reached an absurd result.FN11 However, [pg894] the World Court could not carry this statutory 
approach too far, inasmuch as the Federal Republic was not a party to the 1958 Convention. 
The words of the convention thus could not be binding in all their particularity upon the Federal 
Republic. 
  
 Accordingly, the Court had to look at customary international law, binding upon all 
states. In doing so, the Court would not be construing Article 6, paragraph 2, in a way that 
would be authoritative to the parties to the convention, but rather had to examine the impact of 
that article upon the general fabric of customary law. Nevertheless, the Court was animated by 
the same consideration that would have led to a liberal interpretation of the article had the 
Federal Republic been a party: that the equidistance concept would lead to an unnatural and 
inequitable result for that state.FN12 The Court thereupon proceeded to show that Article 6 
neither stood for nor generated a rule of customary international law binding upon all states, 
including the Federal Republic.  
 
II. THE RULE OF MANIFEST INTENT 
 
 At this point the Court was faced with essentially three possibilities: First, it would be 
logically possible to say that conventional law is totally separate from customary law, and thus 
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that provisions in treaties are irrelevant to non-parties. Although possible, such a position would 
fly in the face of the massive weight of practice to the contrary.FN13 Second, the Court could 
investigate an emerging rule of customary law in parallel to but en dehors the treaty, to which 
the treaty provision on equidistance merely provided some kind of corroborative evidence. This 
approach, to which the Court devoted some time, will be examined later in the present essay. 
Third and lastly, FN14 the Court could and did evolve a methodological rule that looks to the 
manifest, rather than the actual or subjective, intent of the treaty itself in determining whether 
any provision in the treaty “generates” customary international law.FN15  
 
 In exploring the third possibility and rejecting the first, the Court for the first time gave 
explicit, and indeed overwhelming, substantiation to the thesis that provisions in treaties can 
generate customary law, that they [pg895] can be of a "norm-creating character."FN16 There is 
no doubt, as the Court put it, that the norm-creating process “is a perfectly possible one and 
does from time to time occur: it constitutes indeed one of the recognized methods by which 
new rules of customary international law may be formed.”FN17 The Court capped the point by 
citing the first three articles of the Continental Shelf Convention as having a norm-creating 
character.FN18 These articles, inter alia, defined the seaward extent of the continental shelf, 
recognized the coastal state's sovereign rights of exploration and exploitation, spelled out the 
nature of the rights exercisable and the kind of natural resources involved, and preserved the 
legal status of superjacent waters as high seas and the legal status of the airspace above the 
waters.  
 
 But if some provisions in treaties are capable of generating customary law binding upon 
non-parties, clearly there are other types of provisions which do not do so. Provisions spelling 
out barters and exchanges of goods, for instance, would not be generalizable as legal rules for 
all states; the same may be true for provisions analogous to special customary law.FN19 As the 
Court put it, the basic test is whether the provision concerned "should, at all events potentially, 
be of a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis 
of a general rule of law."FN20 
 
 The equidistance principle, in the abstract, could be generalizable as a rule of law.FN21 
The question then becomes: Has the 1955 Convention itself expressed the equidistance 
principle in such a form as to manifest the convention's intent to have that principle generate a 
rule of customary law to the same effect? To answer this question, the Court tells us to look at 
the form in which the rule is cast as well as the structural relation, within the treaty of the rule 
to other provisions in the convention. The form and structure, in short, may reveal whether the 
provision in question may be deemed to have generated a customary rule of law. Importantly, 
the Court makes no suggestion that the travaux are relevant to this determination. In other 
words, the actual intent of the framers of the convention or of the subsequent adherents is 
irrelevant. All that matters with respect to the question whether a treaty provision generates 
customary law, once we pass the basic test mentioned previously, is what we can infer from the 
face of the treaty. If the treaty manifests an intent to have a particular provision create 
customary law, that manifested intent is controlling. (Of course, other sources of law may rebut 
the ensuing rule; we are concerned here solely with that aspect of the proof of customary law 




 Looking first at the form of Article 6, paragraph 2, the Court found several reasons why 
it was manifestly the intent of the convention not to [pg896] have this particular provision 
generate a customary norm. The section reads:  
 
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent states, the 
boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between them.  
In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special 
circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of 
equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea of each state is measured.FN22  
 
The Court made several observations, some not lacking in subtlety, on these words. First, the 
Court noted that the equidistance principle comes after a primary obligation to effect 
delimitation by agreement. This in itself casts doubt on any alleged intent of the treaty to make 
the equidistance principle a rule of international law, since normally rules of law would not be 
prefaced by an exhortation to agreement. Of course, as the Court pointed out, rules of law 
normally may be departed from in particular cases or between particular parties, but this is a 
principle that is understood yet not expressed in most formulations of rules of law. And even 
this principle might be qualified in an abnormal case: the Court briefly raised the issue of jus 
cogens. This mere hint of the concept of jus cogens conceals an interesting argument in further 
support of the Court's result. Whether peremptory rules of international law exist, and if so by 
what method do ordinary rules ascend to such status, is of course a matter of considerable 
current debate.FN23 But since the possibility of such rules exists, it is correspondingly not 
impossible that any given international rule, even the equidistance principle itself, might some 
day rise to the status of a rule of jus cogens. But if such a development were to take place en 
dehors the 1958 Geneva Convention, then that convention itself would contain a contradiction 
in its Article 6, paragraph 2. For that article, by making agreement a primary obligation and 
placing the equidistance principle in secondary status, would be incompatible with the 
possibility of equidistance as a rule of jus cogens. Since the convention does not consciously on 
its face deal with such a result, a better inference to draw is that there was no manifested intent 
to make the equidistance principle a rule of law at all.  
 
 A second category of formal objection to Article 6, paragraph 2, lies in the “part played 
by the notion of special circumstances relative to the principle of equidistance."FN24 The Court 
did not examine what this relationship was, and it contented itself with simply alluding to the 
"very considerable, still unresolved controversies as to the exact meaning and [pg897] scope" of 
the notion of special circumstances.FN25 The terms of Article 6 indeed suggest that there is 
considerable particularity in specifying continental shelf boundaries between adjacent states. 
The difficulty in formulating exact rules for such boundaries simply reflects the general lack of 
international principles for determining boundaries between the land areas of various states. 
Although there have been numerous boundary disputes in the history of international relations, 
nearly all have turned on "special circumstances." Article 6 extends this particularity to 
undersea land masses between adjacent states and, although it refers to the principle of 
equidistance, it qualifies this both by the obligation of agreement and the preface "unless 
another boundary line is justified by special circumstances." The question then is, justified by 
whom? Certainly not by the parties, since they have, at this point, failed to reach agreement. 
5 
 
But then, if the justification is up to a court or an arbitral tribunal, we may surely at least one 
party to plead special circumstances in every case that arises. A concave coast, for instance, 
might be pleaded as a special circumstance! If such be the reality, then the entire provision is 
sufficiently open-ended as to cast grave doubt on its capacity to generate a universal rule of law 
of equidistance.  
 
 After considering the form in which Article 6, paragraph 2, was cast, the Court looked 
at the structure of the convention as a whole. The first paragraph of Article 12 provides:  
 
At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any state may make reservations to 
articles of the Convention other than to Articles 1 to 3 inclusive.  
 
Thus the substantive provisions of the convention (Articles 1 through 7) are divided into two 
categories: Articles 1 to 3 which possess a "norm-creating character" FN26 and Articles 4 to 7 
having a "different and less fundamental status."FN27 This distinction, concluded the Court, 
adds to the evidence that Article 6 was probably not intended on the face of the treaty to be of a 
norm-creating character.  
 
 The foregoing structural argument should not be carried too far. For instance, Judge 
Ammoun in a concurring opinion states that the treaty-given power of reservations to Articles 6 
implies the absence of opinio juris for “it is self-evident that a rule cannot be felt to be binding 
when the right not to apply it is reserved."FN28 But this argument proves too much, for, as 
Judge Morelli observes in dissent, "the power to make reservations is entirely compatible with 
the character of a convention or of a particular rule contained in a convention."FN29 Yet Judge 
Morelli's argument in turn is framed too broadly, for evidently the Continental Shelf 
Convention manifested a distinction between the three and the following four articles; the latter 
were given a ease of reservation which tends to bear out the Court's argument. Parenthetically, 
the dissenting [pg898] judges might have examined for comparison the other Geneva 
Conventions of 1958: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,FN30 the 
Convention on the High Seas,FN3l and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the 
Living Resources of the High Seas.FN32 Although each of these also begins with articles of 
generalized norms and then moves into particulars, none of them distinguish between those two 
classes for purposes of reservations, while the Fishing and Conservation Convention does 
distinguish on an entirely different basis (excluding from reservation certain articles in the body 
of the treaty dealing with procedures for the settlement of disputes under the convention). Such 
a comparison tends to throw some doubt upon the Court's categorization of the Continental 
Shelf Convention, though one might reply that the latter distinction between norm-creating 
provisions and special provisions is at least a plausible division and tends to add weight to the 
non-generalizable form in which Article 6 of that convention is couched. 
 
 Thus the World Court has, with precision and specificity, spelled out a methodology for 
determining distinctions between provisions in treaties as to their norm-creating customary law 
effect. Both the form in which the provision is couched, and the structure of the treaty (as 
evidenced in this case by the exclusion of certain articles from reservation) must be examined 
with care. Most importantly, the Court has clearly come down on the side of those who contend 




 The Court's remaining observations with respect to the alleged norm-creating character 
of the equidistance principle in Article 6 are unfortunately less convincing and considerably 
ambiguous. The Court refers to "other elements usually regarded as necessary before a 
conventional rule can be considered to have become a general rule of international law...."FN33 
First, are the 39 states parties to the convention sufficiently wide-spread and representative in 
number? The Court answers that "the number of ratifications and accessions so far secured is, 
though respectable, hardly sufficient."FN34 Second, has there been sufficient passage of time 
since the convention? The Court casts doubt upon the sufficiency of ten years since the signing 
and less than five since the convention came into force in June, 1964. The difficulty with these 
observations, apart from the obvious drawback that their vagueness appears to be an aspect of 
judicial discretion rather than legal requirement, is that they would apply equally to all the 
provisions of the Continental Shelf Convention. Yet the Court itself with no hesitation found 
that the first three articles were norm-defining or norm-creating in character. This inconsistency 
suggests that the number of parties and the time factors were more in the nature of make-weight 
arguments than analytical distinctions. Roughly the same may be said of the final string in the 
Court's bow—that state practice [pg899]  subsequent to the convention lacks the kind of 
uniformity necessary to show a general recognition that a rule of law is involved. Though The 
Netherlands and Denmark cited "certain cases—not a great number" FN35 in which the 
equidistance principle was used, and though the Court admitted that these cases contained some 
evidential value,FN36 it simply concluded that the cases were inconclusive and insufficient. Of 
course, to the extent that these remaining observations by the Court appear unpersuasive, the 
doctrine of manifest intent assumes increased importance as the true basis for the holding.  
 
III. SHORTCOMINGS IN THE MORE TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
 
 The rule of manifest intent that has just been examined does not draw a distinction 
between the manifest intent to create new law and the manifest intent to declare existing law. 
Rather, as we have seen, the Court's test is simply that if there is a provision in a treaty that is 
generalizable into a rule of customary law, then we must look to its form and structure within 
the treaty to see if there is a manifest intent that it be of a norm-creating character. The norm 
thus created may simply reinforce a pre-existing norm of customary law, or it may sharpen it or 
define it more precisely, or indeed it may create a new norm either in an area where a rule had 
not existed or in an area where a pre-existing rule is supplanted. The Court thus recognizes the 
fact that the conclusion of a treaty is a step of international legal significance taken by two or 
more states, an event on the same juridical basis as a practice of these two or more states that 
would normally have constituted a component of customary law. Not only is there a definite  
meeting of the minds in a treaty (as we infer from an act involving two or more states that 
constitutes practice for the purposes of customary law), but also there is the clear articulation of 
a rule of law that gives the treaty a special impetus toward formulating a general rule. A great 
many rules of customary international law, perhaps even the majority, had their origin in 
treaties,FN37 and the World Court itself in several cases has used treaties for evidence of rules 
of law held binding upon non-parties.FN38  
 
 [pg900] A valuable and meticulous essay published prior to the North Sea Continental 
Shelf decision may be said to represent the traditional view on the relation of provisions in 
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treaties to customary law.FN39 In it Professor Baxter argues that only those treaties which 
declare existing customary law may be cited as evidence of customary law, while treaty 
provisions attempting to create new law or to contribute to its progressive development are not 
in themselves valid evidence of the state of international law. There are three areas which may 
be searched to help draw the distinction with respect to any treaty provision between a 
declaratory or innovative function: the face of the treaty itself, the travaux preparatoires, and 
customary international law dehors the treaty. If the treaty on its face purports to be declaratory 
of existing law, then there is a presumption in that direction, although, as Professor Baxter  
notes, this rule gives rise to possible “abuse" in terms of  “self-serving words of declaration" 
stating that the treaty is declaratory of existing law in order to give it "an influence in customary 
law that it would lack if these words were not inserted."FN40 Thus we have to look beyond the 
treaty, beyond manifest intent to actual intent. But are the travaux helpful in this respect? 
Professor Baxter cogently argues that it is very difficult to extract anything unambiguous from 
travaux about intent to declare or to innovate, and to his arguments it might be added that 
negotiators will often enter into the record statements that their proposed wording or drafts 
should be accepted by the other side because they accurately reflect existing law. But surely 
there is a negotiating utility in seeming to depart the least from existing law as fewer 
concessions will have to be made by taking such a position. Therefore such statements in the 
travaux may be at least as self-serving as similar statements on the face of a treaty.  
 
 Thus Professor Baxter resorts finally to customary law dehors the treaty to show 
whether the treaty declares existing law or constitutes an innovation. There are numerous 
excellent examples in his articles of treaties cited as sources of international law, and as to each 
of these he examines the customary law apart from the treaty. When the independent customary 
law is in accord with the treaty, or in some cases when it at least does not conflict with it, 
Professor Baxter accepts the judicial result that the treaties were properly used as evidence of 
customary law. When the customary [pg901] law apart from the treaty is in conflict with the 
treaty rule, however, Professor Baxter is less willing to accept the soundness of the judicial 
result. 
 
 But the basic problem is that resorting to customary law dehors the treaty in order to 
prove whether the treaty declares such law or derogates from it seems to render valueless the 
treaty itself. For in the latter case, where the treaty derogates from the law, Professor Baxter 
says that the law and not the treaty provision controls. And in the former case, where the treaty 
simply declares existing law, the proof needed to demonstrate what existing law is apart from 
the treaty should quite suffice without any additional need of citing the treaty. In short, 
Professor Baxter's arguments appear to be directed toward the issue whether a treaty itself 
happens to coincide with existing law or depart from it, and not whether there are any law-
creation consequences for either alternative. His method of analysis would not, I suggest, be of 
much help to counsel on either side of a case in which a treaty provision was relied upon in 
support of an allegation of a rule of customary law to the same substantive effect. Nor would it 
seem to help a court having the burden of finding a rule of international law when, as in the 
Nottebohm case,FN41 it is extraordinarily difficult to find any state practice apart from various 
treaties. Further, inasmuch as the International Law Commission has long since given up the 
task of attempting to differentiate between codification and progressive development in its 
work on draft multilateral conventions, and insofar as most treaties at present purport to declare 
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existing law rather than to signal their departure from it, the distinction suggested by Professor 
Baxter might diminish in objective importance even if the difficulties in establishing it could be 
surmounted. 
 
 Professor Baxter's essay reflects the caution with which scholars of international law 
have approached the issue of treaty generation of customary rules of law. As perhaps the most 
cogent statement of the traditional view, it stands as a target for commentary when perhaps it 
would have been fairer, though less efficient, to comment upon the writings of others who share 
his approach. The traditional view, however, does not appear sufficient to explain the origin in 
treaties of many rules of international law, the use of treaties by the World Court, and especially 




 I have argued elsewhereFN42 that a general theory of how customary international law 
comes into being must be (a) internally consistent, (b) general without being vague, (c) in 
accord with all the inductive evidence, (d) simple, (e) objectively determinable, and (f) claim-
oriented. The degree of confusion in the international law literature relative to the formation of 
custom can no longer be acceptable in a shrinking world [pg902] where legal lines must have 
the necessary clarity to minimize mistakes leading to military conflicts, in turn leading to 
possible nuclear escalation. States, as well as scholars, have a basic interest in clarifying the 
theoretical underpinnings of international legal theory in order that they may better determine 
where the substantive legal lines are in fact drawn. A clear boundary, like a good fence, makes 
good neighbors.  
 
 The recent Continental Shelf decision of the World Court is an important step toward 
this goal. It deals only with one area of formation of customary law: the generation by treaty of 
customary norms. But in that area the Court takes a major step of freeing itself from the 
inconclusive hunting of subjective intent, and instead sets up an objectively determinable test: 
the rule of manifest intent. By looking both at the form in which a treaty provision is couched, 
and the structure of the treaty itself, the generalizability or non-generalizability of the provision, 
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